Abraham Kuyper never had to worry much about developing a Calvinistic doctrine of nuclear deterrence. What, one wonders, would Kuyper say today? How would his Calvinism help us understand and practice geopolitics on the nuclear question? This essay proposes to do this in three broad ways. First, inspired by the recent work of Derek Schuurman, our first question must be to ask What is a nuclear weapon? While the answer to this can be technical, and there will be some technicalities, I will argue that in a more fundamental way, a nuclear weapon is a technology; it is a system. And so, it requires the kind of careful architectonic critique for which Neocalvinism is so well suited. Second, I want to reconsider the tradition of just war and the role of nuclear weapons within it. It is clear to me that Neocalvinism broadly finds itself in the Augustinian-Calvinist just war tradition, and as a tradition of theological and philosophical reflection on war, it is especially relevant to see how a Neocalvinist analysis of nuclear weapons fits that framework for war and its ends. Finally, and in the third place, I want to consider the Calvinistic dilemma of nuclear deterrence and human depravity. My conclusion is that the doctrine of nuclear deterrence often depends on a kind of naïve presumption of technological neutrality, a threateningly instrumentalist ethic of war, and a kind of mechanical and material self-interest, a predictive model for human political and social action that is rooted in a dangerously misleading anthropology. Despite this, and contrary to the developing theology of other major Christian traditions, I will argue for what I believe is a consistent Calvinistic nuclear doctrine: a no-first-strike, qualified deterrence.